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DOING THE RIGHT THING:
DEALING WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRY SOVEREIGN
DEBT
Barry Hermant
ABSTRACT
This paper draws on recent discussions by lawyers,
theologians, philosophers, and economists to reach some
conclusions about the just international treatment of the
government over-indebtedness and insolvencies that have occurred
and recurred many times in many developing countries. It asks
what should be considered "fair" expectations in the relationship
between government borrowers and their lenders. It also considers
some proposed reforms in the international treatment of sovereign
borrowing and debt that are prompted by the ethical analyses.
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Introduction
As of December 2005, the governments of developing
countries owed or guaranteed almost $1.5 trillion in foreign debt
obligations, more than half of the $2.8 trillion owed abroad by
public and private sectors combined in developing countries.'
This amount of foreign government debt, let alone the untold
amount that governments owe in their own currencies to their own
residents and institutions, is not in itself a problem. Governments,
like enterprises and households, would pass up far too many
opportunities for economic growth and social advancement if they
did not borrow at all. It is a question of how much is borrowed
and on what terms that matters. The countries that account for
most of the huge amount of sovereign debt in the developing
world are well able to handle their debt, just as most households in
the world successfully manage their personal finances.2 Usually,
the authorities in these countries act prudently and in an informed
way, and they are also lucky to not have had adverse
developments.3
1 See 1 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: THE DEVELOPMENT
POTENTIAL OF SURGING CAPITAL FLOWS: REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND OUTLOOK 196-97
(2006), available at http://go.worldbank.org/P01POZA3V0 [hereinafter GDF 2006].
2 It may be taken as indicative that of the $2.2 trillion of total external debt of the
"net debtor" developing countries at the end of 2005 (including private as well as
sovereign debt), $575 billion was owed by countries with debt difficulties (defined as
countries that had arrears or rescheduled their debt servicing during 1999-2003).
Moreover, as another $844 billion was owed by developing and emerging economy
countries whose external assets exceeded their debts, the problem debts accounted for
under one fifth of total external obligations (based on country groupings, data definitions
and estimates of IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND
ECONOMIC CYCLES: SEPTEMBER 2006, at 250, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/
pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/pdf/weoO9O6.pdf [hereinafter Data of IMF]).
3 As any politician having responsibilities for government spending and revenues
can affirm, budgeting is decision-making under uncertainty. The government plans its
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Rather, the difficulty comes when governments, like many
enterprises and households, find their debt has grown beyond what
they can reasonably manage. They may or may not have acted
prudently or have been well informed about the obligations they
undertook, but they were also decidedly unlucky. When default
becomes inescapable, the debts that governments cannot pay are
almost always owed in foreign currency to foreign creditors and
these are the debts on which the paper will focus.4 Like debt
default for households, an inability to stay current on payments on
external debt causes deep economic trauma.'
The recent Argentine experience illustrates the dimensions a
debt crisis can take in a middle-income country. In Argentina,
where life expectancy at birth is 75 years and approximately 97%
of the population is literate, almost half the population was pushed
below the poverty line by the trough of the economic crisis in
2002, the year following the debt default and collapse of its fixed
exchange rate system.6 Poverty of that magnitude, unfortunately,
annual expenditures based on anticipated revenues and borrowings. As the year evolves,
spending may differ from what was planned (some adjustments are automatic, such as
increased unemployment insurance outlays if the number of insured unemployed rises),
as might revenues (for example, tax revenues may be tied to the international prices of
commodity exports, such as crude petroleum). The year ends with whatever borrowing
is required to cover expenditures net of revenues (for a government that has lost all
access to formal credit, "borrowing" can include arrears, which are involuntary loans).
A "lucky" government is one that faces no adverse economic developments during the
year-or as economists use the term, no "shocks."
4 See Barry Herman, Dealing Deftly with Sovereign Debt Difficulties 4-10
(Columbia Univ. Initiative for Pol'y Dialogue Working Paper Series, 2004), available at
http://wwwO.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/DealingDeftlylO-28.pdf [hereinafter Dealing
Deftly]. Aside from the fact that excessive domestic currency debt rarely leads to
payment suspension, inability of governments to service their foreign debt has threatened
global financial stability on various occasions, making this type of debt crisis a necessary
focus of international policy makers. Id.
5 See, e.g., Bianca De Paoli, Glenn Hoggarth, & Victoria Saporta, Costs of
Sovereign Default, BANK ENG. FIN. STABILITY REP. (2006) (periodic internet
publication), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/fs-paper0.pdf.
6 See Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, [2005] Stat.
Y.B. for Latin America & the Caribbean, table 1.6.1, U.N. Sales No. E/S.06.II.G.I.
More precisely, 45.4% of the urban population fell below the poverty line in 2002,
roughly double what it was in 1990, and 18.6% of the population of the major
metropolitan areas was classified as "indigent," compared to 5.2% in 1990; poverty line
is defined as an income level less than twice the cost of a basic food basket and
"indigent" entails income less than the cost of the food basket.
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is the "normal" situation in the lowest income countries regardless
of debt default. Indeed, almost half of the population of Sub-
Saharan Africa lives on an income of less than one dollar per day
(a shorthand for extreme poverty), and three quarters of the
population live on less than two dollars per day.7 Poor countries
that also suffer from debt problems in this region thus face
obstacles added to these "normal" ones in overcoming poverty.
Moreover, there are too many sovereign debt crises in
developing countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
counts 56 countries that had arrears in their foreign debt payments,
or that rescheduled their debt-servicing obligations during 1999-
2003.8 Together, these countries account for one fifth of world's
population, over one billion people, but less than six percent of
world's gross product. 9 As can be inferred, the debt crisis
countries are mostly low-income ones, although middle-income
countries have also had to restructure those external debts that they
could no longer service, including Argentina, the Dominican
Republic, and Iraq in 2005.'0 These persisting conditions have
made sovereign debt crises in developing countries a major
international policy concern. Indeed, if there is a consensus on
any aspect of developing country debt, it is that new crises will
erupt in the future, perhaps not next year, but perhaps during the
next global economic downturn, perhaps before.
When sovereign debt crises burst open, there is considerable
economic pain, but ultimately the crisis is resolved one way or
another. There is a vast literature on why debt crises occur and on
the processes for resolving them. There is a rapidly growing body
of literature advising governments how to avoid debt crises, how
to maintain debt "sustainability," albeit without a consensus on
what the indicators of sustainability should be."1 There have been
7 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 9 (2006), available at http://go.worldbank.org/
OZRERMGAOO.
8 Data of IMF, supra note 2, at 182, 186 n.7.
9 Id.
10 See GDF 2006, supra note 1, at 73-74.
11 For a critical view of the approach of the Bretton Woods institutions and
references to the main documents of the approach, see Matthew Martin, Debt
Sustainability: Debt Relief Target, Rule for Lending or Policy Goal? (Jan. 2007) (paper
prepared for the Task Force on Sovereign Debt of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue,
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many proposals for reforming the sovereign debt workout process,
going back at least to the debt arbitration mechanism adopted in
the Hague Convention of 1907.12 There seems to be a smaller
literature on the ethical issues embodied in sovereign debt and its
crises, and what a "just" workout mechanism might look like. 3
This paper investigates those questions. 4
After an introductory survey of the actors, their interests and
modus operandi in sovereign debt, and how debt crises are
resolved in practice, this paper asks what a theological focus
brings to the discussion of sovereign debt problems. This is
followed by discussion of some philosophical questions regarding
where to place responsibility for debt problems and what
consequences that responsibility should have on debt crisis
resolution. The extreme case of "odious" debt is also considered,
especially in the context of an international sanctions regime to
change odious state behavior. Finally, this paper claims that
justice demands that sovereign debt crises be treated in some yet-
to-be-designed official international forum.
I. The Game of Sovereign Debt and its Players
Before entering directly into the ethical issues in debt, it seems
useful to briefly recall who the parties are in a sovereign debt
crisis. 15 This begins, of course, with the developing country
Columbia Univ., most recent draft available from the author at Debt Relief International,
London).
12 See [Hague] Convention [No. II] On Laws of War: Limitation of Employment
of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607,
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague072.htm.
13 This is not to say that critiques of actual or proposed reforms ignore questions of
fairness or justice. See, e.g., the extensive literature on the Eurodad webpage,
www.eurodad.org, including such titles as "The Repudiation Option," "Skeletons in the
Cupboard: Illegitimate Debt Claims of the G7," "La Loi des Cr~anciers Contra les Doits
des Citoyens," and "Responsible Financing or Unwarranted Obligations."
14 This paper is an outgrowth of a project that aimed to explore philosophical
analyses that might be applied to questions of debt policy reform that this author co-
directed with Christian Barry of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.
Several papers prepared for that project are published in the 1st issue of volume 21 of
ETHICS & INT'L AFF. (2007). These and other papers for the project will be collected in
DEALING FAIRLY WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT (Christian Barry, Barry Herman, &
Lydia Tomitova forthcoming 2007).
15 For an elaboration of these notes, see Barry Herman, Introduction: The Players
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government as the borrower. Most governments have a diverse set
of creditors, including commercial bankers, purchasers of
government bonds, other governments that lend to them, and
international financial institutions (IFIs), principally the IMF and
the World Bank.' 6 When a debt default throws the debtor and its
creditors together-and the usual event is a broad default,
although almost always excluding a cessation of payments to the
IFIs-the various creditors bring different views on the need for
speed, let alone on the sharing of losses, in a negotiated workout
agreement resulting from the default."
Repayment amounts and terms that are applied to the different
types of creditors result from separate negotiations in different
institutions or forums. 18 Debts owed to governments are
restructured by decisions of the main "bilateral" creditors meeting
in the Paris Club; 19 debts owed to commercial banks are
renegotiated with ad hoc banker groups called London clubs (or
Bank Advisory Committees); 20 bondholder claims are usually
settled through debtor government offers to exchange new bonds,
often having lower value, for defaulted old bonds (if enough
bondholders accept the swap, as stipulated in the bond contract, it
becomes valid);2' finally, decisions to reduce obligations to IFIs-
available only to the poorest countries-are made by the donor-
dominated governing boards of the institutions.22 Will the total
amount of relief add up to what the debtor country economy needs
in order to have a fighting chance to grow, create jobs, service its
remaining debt normally, and move toward eradicating poverty?
Or, will the debt workout agreement give the debtor country just
enough relief to return to full debt servicing with little budgetary
room left for public investment and essential social services?
Unfortunately, the experience over the past quarter century has
and the Game of Sovereign Debt, 21 ETHics & INT'L AFF. 5 (2007) [hereinafter
Introduction].
16 Id. at 10-29.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 19-22.
20 Id. at 12-14.
21 Introduction, supra note 15, at 17-19.
22 Id. at 22-29.
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been more the latter than the former.23
While IMF has usually assumed the role of international
arbiter of how much relief, new financing, and policy reform a
country needs to overcome its debt crisis, it has been widely
accused of systematically underestimating the amount of relief
needed.24 This could reflect an institutional optimistic bias, since
its needs assessment for a country is based on the outcome
promised when the country follows the IMF's policy advice. In
addition, it is only fair to note that the IMF as an institution does
not control any of the creditors that are expected to take losses
from debt relief and its ability to influence them varies. Each
creditor would prefer to collect the most it can of what is owed to
it and leave it to the other creditors to take larger losses or leave
the debtor to struggle as necessary to make remaining payments.
Private creditors have never claimed to be in the business of
poverty eradication and one can argue about the relative priority of
that goal even among some of the official creditors; e.g., it is not
the mandate of export credit agencies whose claims are treated in
the Paris Club.
What thus seems to be missing in the financial architecture of
sovereign debt is some effective coordinating mechanism, in
essence a sovereign analogue to bankruptcy "protection" afforded
to corporate debtors (such as Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy
code), in which law and precedent guide a judge as she oversees
23 See Dealing Deftly, supra note 4, at 15-24. This experience reflects, in part,
evolving views on what the outcome of a debt restructuring is intended to be. Id.
24 See, e.g., HELPING THE POOR? THE IMF AND LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES (Jan Joost
Teunissen & Age Akkerman eds., 2005); U.N. Conf. on Trade & Devel., Economic
Development in Africa: Debt Sustainability: Oasis or Mirage?, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2004/l, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.37 (2004), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsafrica2004 I-en.pdf.
25 Export credit agencies are created by governments to promote national exports.
Indeed, there have been explicit conflicts of interest between national export promotion
and development assistance strategies, a notable example of which was the sale of an
expensive air-traffic control system to Tanzania in 2001 that the British Government
financed that "safeguards 250 jobs on the Isle of Wight." The U.K. Development
Minister, Claire Short, bitterly opposed the sale as an inappropriate addition to
Tanzanian debt, which was being relieved by the British and other donor governments at
the time. For a debate on the controversy, see Postings to Discussion Board, Tanzania:
Is the UK Radar Deal Justified?, BBC Talking Points, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/talking-point/1722213.stm (Dec. 21, 2001).
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the efforts of the relevant parties to restructure a firm so it can
survive, while honoring as many of the creditors' claims as
feasible.26 Although several proposals have been made to create a
coherent and development-oriented international mechanism for
debt workouts, none has won broad support among governments.27
Creditors and even the largest debtor governments prefer to take
their chances in the existing fragmented system. Perhaps they
prefer the "evil they know" to an unknown arrangement, to play
the existing game of sovereign debt rather than a new one whose
rules they would have to master as they sought strategies to
maximize their respective advantage.
If there were a global debt-workout mechanism (a point I
return to at the end of this paper), one would want to know not
only that it operated efficiently to bring all the relevant parties
together and reach an agreement in a timely way, but also that the
workout agreement was just. There is no reason to presume that
different players competing to advance their own interest reach a
social optimum under the existing debt game. We know that vast
numbers of people sense the injustice in how sovereign debt has
been treated internationally. One can see strong evidence of this
in the Jubilee 2000 movement, an international coalition of
national networks of civil society organizations in 69 developed
and developing countries that successfully pressured the
governments of the major creditor countries to cancel the debts
that poor countries owed to them and the international financial
institutions they controlled. 2' An international coordination
mechanism should aim to do better, but then, what does "better"
mean?
26 See Introduction, supra note 15, at 29-31.
27 See Dealing Deftly, supra note 4, at 24-37.
28 See THE WORLD WILL NEVER BE THE SAME AGAIN 17 (Marlene Barrett, ed.,
Jubilee 2000 Coalition, 2000), available at http://www.jubileeresearch.org/analysis/
reports/J2REPORT.pdf. Illustrative of the pressure is that in September 2000, in the
context of the Millennium Summit, Jubilee 2000 presented to the United Nations
Secretary-General a petition calling on the leaders of the richest countries to cancel the
debts of the poorest. It was signed by 24 million people from 166 countries. Id. (this
reference also contains a history of the movement). For a more inclusive study of the
efforts of civil society to influence international finance, see CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBAL
FINANCE (Jan Aart Scholte & Albrecht Schnabel eds., 2002).
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II. A Theological Focus on the Consequences of Over-
Indebtedness
The fact that the terms of sovereign debt workouts have
improved over time for many of the heavily indebted countries-
albeit not fast enough or for enough countries-owes much to the
steady and often heavy pressure of civil society campaigns that
embarrass creditor governments before their voters and embolden
debtor governments in facing their public and private creditors, as
noted above. The civil society campaigns seem to have drawn
much of their strength from arguments based on theological
reflections on justice and from such global religious institutions as
the Catholic Church and networks like the World Council of
Churches. 29 Indeed, the rallying cry of the major anti-debt
campaign over the past decade has been to call for debt relief in
the "Jubilee Year," itself a biblical concept.3 °
As we will see, the central concern for writers in this tradition
has been that sovereign debt obligations can become oppressive
and keep or push people in heavily indebted countries into extreme
poverty. This is regarded as morally unacceptable. Extreme
poverty-especially with the technology available today-is a
result of how societies are organized, how the social product is
produced and shared among the population. Sovereign debt crises
are seen to aggravate extreme poverty or impede efforts to
eradicate it. Neither sovereign debt crises nor poverty are
immutable facts of nature and one may conceive of ways to
eliminate them (especially thinking globally). Since we are
instructed by our religions to care about our fellow creatures
("solidarity"), we are obligated to work to overcome the debt
crises and seek to eradicate poverty. An even stronger view can
be found among some theologians, namely, that the bible warns us
that a society with extreme poverty (especially when accompanied
29 See infra, notes 32-34.
30 While Christian churches have been centrally engaged in the debt advocacy
movement, the movement itself draws strong support from people of other faiths and
secular supporters. Without them, the movement would not have achieved even its
limited, albeit important, successes. Nevertheless, much of the rhetoric of the anti-debt
movement over the past several decades-and its moral appeal-has drawn importantly
from the Judeo-Christian traditions that are the focus of the essays discussed in this
section. See Semper Reformanda: World Alliance of Reformed Churces, Economy in
the Service of Life, http://www.warc.ch/pc/eslife/index.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2007).
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by extreme wealth) is unsustainable, let alone unjust. Not only
can poverty be addressed, but also ultimately it must be addressed
for the survival of the society. Under both arguments, excessive
debt must be relieved and a "fresh start" afforded.
Seen from the world of practical politics, these are highly
radical points of view. In fact, no debts are relieved except under
very extreme circumstances, as under formal "bankruptcy
protection," as noted above for the corporate case, when the
alternative faced would be closing down the firm (and thus greater
losses for the creditors), or socially intolerable pauperization in the
case of a household. There is nothing comparable to bankruptcy
for sovereign governments, where the alternatives are limited to
redirecting more public expenditure to the creditors, raising more
tax revenue for the creditors, or reducing the government's debt
obligations. Moving international policy even partially towards
the latter solution has required prolonged and intense advocacy by
millions of people around the world. Something very powerful
must have been motivating them; something very appealing like
the core idea of the "fresh start."
A. An Interpretation of the Judeo-Christian Tradition on
Debt
Ton Veerkamp, a founder of Kairos Europa,3 traces the origin
of the "fresh start" case for debt relief back to biblical calls for
periodic household debt forgiveness in "Jubilee Years."3 2 The
most striking aspect of his view is that the Jubilee idea not only
spoke to some innate sense of fairness, but also, and more
importantly, would have served the crucial political function of
maintaining social cohesion in the small-scale, and basically
stateless, society of ancient rural Judea during the time of the exile
of the Jewish elites to Babylon. " Periodically forgiving all
31 Kairos Europa is an ecumenical network critical of neoliberal globalization that
aims to stimulate the participation of churches in a "conciliar process of mutual
commitment to justice, peace[,] and the integrity of creation." Semper Reformanda:
World Alliance of Reformed Churces, God or Mammon?, http://www.warc.ch/pc/
soester/07.htm (last visited Apr. 27. 2007).
32 Ton Veerkamp, Judeo-Christian Tradition on Debt: Political Not Just Ethical,
in DEALING FAIRLY WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT (Christian Barry et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2007).
33 Id.
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debts-and not only the debts of the poorest households-would
reverse the increasingly unequal income and wealth distribution
that the normal operation of the economy generated.34 Veerkamp
notes that, whether or not the principle was actually applied
(which we do not know), it was decidedly not applied during
periods of strong states, whether in the earlier Davidic kingdoms
or when the ancient Jewish people were under the Greeks or
Romans.35 State power can and does sustain radically unequal
wealth, at least for a time. 36 In that reality, the biblical
prescriptions for income and wealth redistribution survive only as
ethical maxims, albeit, we might add, compelling ones for many,
many people.37
Veerkamp goes on to argue that it is possible even in modern
times for the redistributive principles to be made into policy
through politics. 38 He warns, however, that this is not easy.3 9 He
recounts how people with different economic interests tend to
fruitlessly talk past each other, often invoking different moral
principles and perhaps not even understanding-let alone
appreciating-the views of the other side.40  Whether or not
mutual learning is possible, political pressures can force policy
change.41 Veerkamp thus for many years joined with the World
Council of Churches and other networks and institutions in calling
for organizing masses of people around the world to create
precisely this political pressure to change policies on the treatment
of debt crises.42
He acknowledges, moreover, that politics is not for the faint-
hearted.43 It is messy in a way that "a purely individualistic ethic
must always find embarrassing," using the terminology of the
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See Veerkarnp, supra note 32.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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American theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr. 4 Veerkamp describes as
a case-in-point the debt policy of Nehemiah, governor of what was
at the time the Judean province of the Persian Empire. "
Nehemiah faced a debtors' political movement that he could either
attempt to suppress or accommodate.46 He opportunely chose the
latter.47
Veerkamp would apparently like to see the international
movement for debt relief-Jubilee and its successors-become
powerful enough to bring about sufficient debt cancellation for
poor countries and give them the kind of "fresh start" that the
biblical authors talked about giving to families in ancient Judea.48
He says we need it today for the same reason the Jewish people
needed it then: a world of sovereign states as unequal as ours,
tolerating extreme poverty, is ultimately unsustainable.49
B. Catholic Church Activism on International Debt
Members of the Catholic Church have been strongly involved
in the Jubilee Movement from its early years in the 1980s through
the Millennium Year and beyond. Many in the Church leadership,
including Pope John Paul II, spoke out for its principles, prepared
formal statements in response to it, and pressed Catholic political
and financial leaders to take it into account.' ° Elizabeth Anne
Donnelly, an American activist in Catholic social movements, has
traced this development of Catholic involvement in the
international policy response to developing country debt crises,
starting from its origins in the concerns expressed to Church
leaders by social service agencies and missionaries in heavily
44 Veerkamp, supra note 32 (citing REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND
IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ETHICS AND POLITICS xi (1932)).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, What Does the Church
Say about Debt and Justice?, http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/intemational/
ccdebt/church.htm (last visited May 1, 2007); Sramus O'Gorman, A Catholic
Perspective on Just Debt Solutions: Ethical Principals in Favor of FTAP (Int'l Jesuit
Network for Dev. Debt Technical Working Group Discussion Paper, 2003),
http://www.jesuit.ie/ijnd/FrAP-apr03.pdf
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indebted developing countries in the 1980s."
Through an analysis of two prominent 1980s statements on the
debt crisis-one by the Pontifical Commission on Justice and
Peace (1987) and the other by the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops (1989)-as well as reflecting on Catholic social
teachings that underlay these statements, she emphasizes the social
imperative that in Catholic religious tradition is called "exercising
a preferential option for the poor."52 That phrase, however, seems
open to wide interpretation. Donnelly interprets it as meaning that
when economic or political institutions exacerbate poverty, they
should be recognized as "institutionalized violence and social sin"
and should be "addressed."53 Others might consider that holding
private or even public financial institutions to such a standard is
quite a radical idea.
The core implication of the "option for the poor" as regards
external debt of developing countries is that it directly links debt
relief and poverty alleviation. As Donnelly argued, to the extent
that honoring debt obligations impeded the ability of countries to
overcome extreme poverty, the debt was a problem that morally
cried out to be addressed. One could add that the developed
country governments and IFIs accepted the rhetoric of this
approach in adopting their Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPCs) Initiative, in which the promise of "adequate" debt
reduction was coupled with debtor country commitments to
develop "poverty reduction strategies" in consultation with their
civil society organizations.54 Unfortunately, when it came time to
operationalize the Initiative, the developed countries did not
reduce the total amount of debt by enough to put the poorest
countries into a "sustainable" debt situation, as defined by the
creditors themselves.55
51 See Elizabeth A. Donnelly, Making the Case for Jubilee: The Catholic Church
and the Poor Country Debt Movement, 21 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 107 (2007).
52 Id. at 110.
53 Id.
54 The HIPC Initiative with its "Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers" is described
(and regularly monitored) by the World Bank. See World Bank, Debt Relief: At a
Glance, http://go.worldbank.org/KNZR2IIQG0 (last visited Apr. 27, 2007).
55 Aside from evidence of inadequacy from the mere fact that the Initiative was
repeatedly "enhanced" by IMF and the World Bank, the Bank's own internal evaluators
raised such concerns. See WORLD BANK, OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEP'T, DEBT RELIEF
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While the goal of debt relief seemed broadly analogous to the
"fresh start" of the biblical principle, the inadequate amount of
debt cancellation was repeatedly associated with the still
inadequate levels of education and health spending.56 Again and
again, since the HIPC Initiative was first launched in 1996, civil
society movements brought widespread public attention to the
creditors' miserly approach to relief.57 Each time, some additional
relief was forthcoming." Most recently, in 2005, this took the
form of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative,59 which eliminates
most remaining external debt obligations of a group of HIPCs,
aimed explicitly to help them achieve the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), the first and foremost being to halve
extreme poverty by 2015.60
Achieving the MDGs is not only for the poorest countries.6'
Those countries that have managed to sustain a strong rate of
economic growth, most notably China and India, are likely to
succeed.62 Those that recently underwent financial crises face a
FOR THE POOREST: AN OED REVIEW OF THE HIPC INITIATIVE (2003) (prepared by
Madhur Guatam), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/HIPC-
OED-review.pdf [hereinafter OED REVIEW]; see also WORLD BANK, INDEPENDENT
EVALUATION GROUP, DEBT RELIEF FOR THE POOREST: AN EVALUATION UPDATE OF THE
HIPC INITIATIVE (2006) (which traces the enhancements over time), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/ieghipcupdateevauation2
006.pdf [hereinafter EVALUATION UPDATE].
56 See Donnelly, supra note 51, at 121-23.
57 See, e.g., id. at 123.
58 See OED REVIEW, supra note 55, at 2; see also EVALUATION UPDATE, supra note
55, at 7-10.
59 See World Bank, Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative MDRI Fact Sheet,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/mdri-eng.pdf (last visited
Apr. 27, 2007).
60 See U.N. SECRETARIAT, DEPT. OF EcON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 3-4 (2006), available at http://unstats.un.org/
unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2006/MDGReport2006.pdf [hereinafter
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS].
61 All U.N. Member States endorsed the Millennium Declaration of 2000. See
G.A. Res. 55/2, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000). The Millennium
Declaration introduces MDGs, commitment to which was "strongly reiterated" at the
U.N. World Summit in 2005. G.A. Res. 60/1, 26(b), U.N. Doc. A/60/1 (Oct. 24,
2005).
62 MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, supra note 60, at 23.
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greater challenge.63 Argentina provides an example of that fact.
Catholic bishops became more actively engaged in Argentina's
economic situation as the crisis deepened, as reported in a paper
by Thomas Trebat, Executive Director of the Institute of Latin
American Studies at Columbia University and a former managing
director and head of Latin American economic research at
Citigroup.64 In his view, the Catholic Church served as a credible
institution in the midst of Argentina's political and economic
collapse and helped to facilitate-if "after some considerable
hesitation and misgivings"-a broad national dialogue of
government and civil society.65
The Argentine story is particularly interesting because the
Church there has a history of association with the business and
political elite.66 Apparently, a number of Argentina's bishops
increasingly lost patience with them and the rigid policies they
persisted in following at great economic and social CoSt. 67 Trebat
notes that at one point in 2000, the Argentine Church supported a
protest march led by dissident union leaders against the IMF,
which had endorsed and financially supported the policy
rigidities. 68 By the end of 2001, when the financial collapse finally
came, Argentina had been in recession for 45 months.6 9 Church
criticism focused on the damage done to Argentine society as a
whole, as well as to the poor in particular.70
This notwithstanding, the Argentine Church was not part of the
Jubilee Movement. It sought to occupy a middle ground between
the religious debt campaigners and the creditor interests. 7' As
Trebat reports, the Church called on the Administration of Nestor
Kirchner to negotiate in good faith with Argentina's creditors and
also expressed concern for some of the holders of defaulted
63 See id.
64 See Thomas J. Trebat, Argentina, the Church and the Debt, 21 ETHICS & INT'L
AFF. 135, 136 (2007).
65 Id. at 152.
66 See id. at 136.
67 Id. at 148-51.
68 Id. at 149.
69 Id. at 151.
70 Trebat, supra note 64, at 151-52.
71 See id. at 153.
20071
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Argentine bonds, including Italian households.12 It accepted the
legitimacy of Argentina's debt and the presumption that it should
be paid. " But the Argentine Church also asserted a moral
presumption that substantial relief was warranted in this case
owing to the cost already paid by Argentine society from having
tried to service its debt.
7 4
Trebat sees two lessons in the Argentine episode.75 First,
creditors of emerging market governments should appreciate that
"once a reasonable effort to repay has been made, demands for
repayment according to strict contractual terms may be legal, but
not morally defensible., 76 That is to say that there is-and should
be assumed to be-a risk in lending to sovereigns. Second,
Argentina's elites "must be cognizant that theirs is a profoundly
unjust society and that priority in matters of debt must be given to
human development rather than blind adherence to what the
bishops called 'the tyranny of the markets."'
77
C. Implications: The Post-Jubilee Advocacy Agenda
In sum, in Argentina, as in the HIPC Initiative, the "ethical"
became "political," as Veerkamp might say. However, the tension
has remained palpable between the efforts of the debt campaigners
to bring about major relief versus the efforts of many of the
creditor authorities to simply coop the language of the Jubilee
campaign without adopting its policy prescriptions. Debt activists
contend that they have much still to accomplish. 78 First,
governments whose debts were cancelled must be monitored and
pressed to redirect freed up resources to poverty alleviation.
Second, the principle linking adequacy of debt reduction to
achieving the MDGs needs to be extended to all countries needing
it, not only to the selected HIPCs. Finally, as Donnelly concludes,
72 Id.
73 Id. at 156.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 157-58.
76 Trebat, supra note 64, at 157
77 Id.
78 See, e.g., Eurodad, supra note 50; The British Jubilee Debt Campaign,
http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk; The 2007 Sabbath Year Campaign, http://
www.jubileeusa.org.
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since the central issue is poverty, the focus on debt needs to be
complemented with strong attention paid to trade and foreign aid
policy under such broad banners as "Make Poverty History.
79
In other words, the theologically oriented arguments presented
in this section have asserted that because suffering from extreme
poverty is unconscionable and unwise (as it is ultimately
unsustainable politically), the economically powerful states of the
world should accord developing countries a "fresh start" whenever
it is observed that the external sovereign debt of those countries
holds back their ability to overcome poverty. This call for debt
relief applies firstly to defaulting governments, because default
brings on a major financial trauma with severe social
consequences.8" It is not a step taken lightly. But by the logic of
the argument, it should also apply to countries that meet their debt-
servicing obligations at great social sacrifice. Admittedly, every
government is responsible for how it raises and budgets its
resources and so there may well be non-debt-related reasons for
short-changing anti-poverty expenditure. Thus, decisions on
which countries should get how much relief has to be open to
interpretation. Nevertheless, the commitment of all the world's
governments to achieve the MDGs by 2015 adds a degree of
concreteness to governmental and intergovernmental obligations:
relief should be accorded to every country in danger of not
achieving the MDGs owing to external debt servicing.
81
In short, the authors discussed here, drawing on the Judeo-
Christian tradition, view debt instrumentally as a factor affecting
their main concern: poverty and social cohesion. This implies that
when debt cancellation is warranted, it should be delivered so as to
effectively address the wider anti-poverty imperatives. The
implications are systemic. First, the debt relief process described
earlier should be restructured so as to take proper account of the
79 Donnelly, supra note 51, at 129-30.
80 See De Paoli et al., supra note 5.
81 This point was acknowledged-if not acted on-by the 2005 World Summit of
the United Nations, when the assembled heads of state and government underlined "the
importance of debt sustainability to the efforts to achieve national development goals,
including the Millennium Development Goals, recognizing the key role that debt relief
can play in liberating resources that can be directed towards activities consistent with
poverty eradication, sustained economic growth[,] and sustainable development." G.A.
Res. 60/1, 26(b), U.N. Doc. A/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
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potential anti-poverty impact. Who, after all, speaks for the poor
in the various sets of negotiations outlined earlier? Second,
effective processes are needed for ensuring that the relief is in fact
translated into appropriate public expenditure. Who, after all,
insures government accountability to the poor? And third, debt
relief must be seen as but one instrument among many that can be
brought to bear in the struggle to bring about a more just world.
After all, if developed countries fully opened their markets to the
exports of developing countries, would so many countries even
need to seek debt relief?
III.A Philosophical Focus on the Responsibilities of Parties to
Loans
As we have seen, a strong case can be made for cancelling the
foreign debts of the government in a poor country when they cause
or contribute to significant hardship of the-people. This entails, of
course, imposing a loss on the creditors (or whoever insures
them). We may not feel much sympathy with rich creditors, for
whom the loss might be minor. However, do we feel differently if
we realize that the ultimate creditors are not the owners of faceless
institutions behind marble walls, but people like ourselves? After
all, "we" believe that we lent that money in good faith.
The universal presumption in international legal affairs is that
every loan agreement should be honored (pacta sunt servanda);
each loan should be repaid with interest on schedule.83 But debt
contracts, like virtually all contracts, routinely have clauses
dealing with how to handle the situation when one or another party
fails to fulfill its obligations under the contract. The ability to
fulfill such an obligation may be compromised by any number of
eventualities and the contracting parties need to agree beforehand
how to respond to such cases, or how to go about deciding how to
82 The World Bank HIPC reports and evaluations noted above give much
quantitative detail on the reductions of debt absorbed by official creditors and the donors
that cover the multilateral institution losses. For losses by private creditors in major debt
workouts, see Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Haircuts: Estimating
Investor Losses in Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998-2005 (IMF Working Paper
WP/05/137, July 2005).
83 This is actually an application to international commercial contracts of a more
general proposition about international agreements, which has been termed the "oldest
principle of international law." MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 812 (2003).
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handle such cases (e.g., to resolve the problem in a court of law or
by arbitration).
The ethical question in this context can be framed in terms of
what a just set of relationships would be between borrower and
lender. What would a just loan contract look like, and what should
parties to a loan do if they wanted to act justly? Writers who raise
such questions, such as Christian Barry and Lydia Tomitova of the
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, ask what
should be the legitimate expectations and responsibilities of the
different parties agreeing to the loan and what should be done
when the government's debt-the result of a series of loan
contracts with different creditors-cannot be serviced as
contracted.84
Barry and Tomitova approached this problem by asking when
does a sovereign have an "ethical obligation" to repay a debt and
when should it honor that obligation? 85 "Obligation" in this sense
speaks to a relationship between the parties to a loan; "honoring
the obligation" speaks to actions taken or not taken to make a
payment at a particular time. 16 The authors approach these
separate questions by asking, under what circumstances ought a
borrowing government repay, when might it permissibly repay,
and when ought it not repay a debt. 87 The answers are
complicated, as sometimes a government ought not to repay a debt
it is obliged to repay (e.g., if honoring a commitment to pay would
impoverish the population, which is to say, when an obligation not
to impoverish overrides the obligation to the creditor). 8  Also, the
authors see cases in which a borrower ought to repay even if it has
no ethical obligation to pay (e.g., even if the loan was immoral in
some sense, the government might pay to maintain its credit
standing among potential lenders, a strategic objective so as to
hold down future borrowing costs). 89 By the same token, creditors
sometimes ought to demand repayment, might permissibly
84 Christian Barry & Lydia Tomitova, Fairness in Sovereign Debt, 73 Soc. REs.
649 (2006).
85 Id. at 654-60.
86 See id. at 656-57.
87 Id. at 653.
88 Id.
89 See id. at 657-58.
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demand repayment, or ought to forgive repayment when the debtor
has an ethical obligation to repay, and even when there is no such
obligation. 90
The authors' strategy for sorting through these possibilities is
to posit idealized conditions under which loan contracts in general
between any two parties should be enforceable, and then asking
how this informs a discussion of sovereign debt.9' Their idealized
conditions are that (a) the contracting parties should be rational
agents who are willing (and implicitly able) to bear the full risk of
loss to get the potential gain from a loan; (b) both are "formally
free" so that neither has the right to dictate the terms of agreement;
(c) both are "substantively free" so that neither can effectively
dictate the terms of agreement to the other; (d) both have the
information they need and are competent to assess the prospective
contract; and (e) the environment in which the contracting parties
operate is "relatively stable" so few "unforeseeable changes"
occur.
92
These criteria are held to be attractive because, when they are
obtained, parties would make only mutually beneficial loans. 9
Also, as these loan contracts would be legally enforceable, it
would discourage parties from breaking the contract for which
they would be held accountable. 94 Moreover, under these criteria,
rich people would have the confidence to lend in the first place,
permitting the more efficient allocation of financial resources and
more economic growth. 95 In addition to such "consequentialist"
considerations, Barry and Tomitova are attracted to these criteria
for so-called "deontological" reasons, i.e., because they would
give opportunities for people to develop their sense of duty and act
ethically.96 The authors see the process of borrowing and repaying
90 Barry & Tomitova, supra note 84, at 657-58.
91 Id. at 664-68.
92 The difference between (d) and (e) can be interpreted as taking account of the
difference between evaluating known or knowable risks owing to the normal variability
of economic activity versus uncertainty about economic "shocks" that are, by nature,
surprises.
93 See Barry & Tonitova, supra note 84, at 657-58.
94 Id.
95 See id.
96 Id.
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as encouraging personal ethical development (becoming a "person
of integrity"). 97
Barry and Tomitova then ask how much of this applies at the
level of sovereign borrowing in the world, as it exists.98 Their
answer is, alas, not enough.99 To start, sovereign debtors are not
individuals but complex collections of individuals, some of whom
usually count much more than others. '00 Also, the borrowing
government may be formally free, but far from "substantively
free."' 0 ' In addition, borrowers may not fully appreciate the risks
they enter into when borrowing (and one could add that sovereign
borrowers and their creditors have at times taken on excessive
risks on the assumption-true in some years and false in others-
that they would be bailed out by the official international
community). 102 Finally, the global economic environment has
been more volatile than expected in recent decades and subject to
major uncertainties. 103
This seems a sensible framework, but does it help us figure out
where justice lies in resolving a sovereign debt crisis?
A. Responsibility of Debtors
One may ask if, in practice, there are circumstances in which
creditors have a moral claim to be paid in a sovereign debt crisis,
acknowledging that the burden might be born by the residents of a
low-income country experiencing political and economic
difficulty. When should the debtors be held responsible?
A first presumption might be that those responsible for
undertaking the debt are obliged to repay it. In other words, one
could argue that citizens of a democracy should pay because they
are responsible for acts of their government, including the signing
of loan contracts. But this is not as straightforward as it seems.
Sanjay Reddy, an economist at Barnard College, notes in this
97 Id. at 667.
98 Id. at 668-74.
99 See Barry & Tomitova, supra note 84, at 668.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 670.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 672.
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context that at any moment in time, including the day a loan
contract is signed, the state represents a collection of individuals
who are at different points in their life cycle, including, of course,
some yet to be born, who will be affected by the terms of the
loan.' 4 Thus, democracy per se cannot be an effective criterion
for sovereign debtor responsibility to repay any long-term loan, as
the unborn cannot vote.
Reddy argues that the state can nevertheless morally bind its
ongoing collective of people in the country to repay its debt. 105 He
posits that the collective would be morally bound to repay if the
people in the country "equitably" share the benefits and costs of
the debt (satisfying some agreed distributional criteria, such as
fairly sharing the tax burden for repaying and deciding how or
where in the country the proceeds of the loan would be spent and
the benefits of the loan captured), assuming also that the overall
outcome is "beneficial" for the country (again, satisfying some
agreed meaning, as in terms of economic growth)." 6 In other
words, creditors could fairly demand repayment from the state
when it contained net beneficiaries of the loans and the
distribution of the net benefits had been arrived at fairly. 07 Reddy
thus takes us to a point of intersection with the theological
arguments discussed earlier. The call of the latter for debt
cancellation posited the negation of the conditions warranting
repayment, i.e., when debt servicing impedes achieving the
MDGs. 108 This conclusion hinges, in Reddy's terms, on the
104 Sanjay G. Reddy, International Debt: The Constructive Implications of Some
Moral Mathematics, 21 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 33 (2007).
105 Id. at 38-40.
106 Id.
107 Id. Axel Gosseries, Should They Honor the Promises of their Parents' Leaders?
in DEALING FAIRLY WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT (Christian Barry et al., eds.,
forthcoming 2007), takes a similar approach, but asks us to pay attention in making the
assessment to the consequences of the loan as well in the lending country (e.g., less
domestic investment and economic growth compared to having retained the funds in the
creditor country). More broadly, he examines ethical principles that might apply to
sovereign foreign debt that span generations and finds several reasons why actions of
one generation cannot, per se, ethically obligate the following one to repay. This is taken
to invalidate "odious debt" claims for canceling sovereign debt (see Section C below), as
well as arguments to repay in "normal" circumstances. He finds distributive approaches
to be more firmly grounded in ethical principles for discussions of such cases.
108 Id.
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negative impact of debt servicing on the poor and the lack of
fairness when the prospective benefits of the loans were allocated
in the first place.'0 9
Implicit in Reddy's argument is not only that the state should
be willing to pay when there are net benefits of the debt, but that it
has the ability to repay. But should the debtor state have to repay
even if there were no net benefits of the loans? The nature of a
debt contract is to put all the risk on the borrower: even if the
project for which the funds were borrowed fails, the borrower is
still expected to repay the loan."0 Reddy attempts to address this
problem by calling for "modified debt contracts" that entail claims
for repayment and interest that are contingent on the outcomes
realized from the loans."'
Unfortunately, creditors have generally shown little interest in
any such "modified debt contracts," outside of Islamic finance." 2
The major instances in which the market has accepted sovereign
loans with built-in contingent payments have been as part of debt
restructuring negotiations, which were not unconstrained
choices." 3 In those arrangements, payments depended in part on
the international price of a major export commodity (in particular,
crude oil) or on growth of gross domestic product (GDP). 14
By the same token, sovereign borrowers with normal market
109 See id. at 33.
110 Reddy, supra note 104, at 41.
"'I Id.
112 Islamic finance prohibits fixed interest loan contracts. See Nadeem UI Haque &
Abbas Mirakhor, The Design of Instruments for Government Finance in an Islamic
Economy (IMF, Working Paper 98/54, Mar. 1998), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9854.pdf.
113 Emerging Markets Traders Association, Primer on Mexican Value Recovery
Rights, Apr. 18, 2000, available at http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/primer.pdf. This is
underlined by the name commonly assigned to such payments-"value recovery rights."
Id.
114 See Ken Miyajima, How to Evaluate GDP-Linked Warrants: Price and
Repayment Capacity (IMF, Working Paper 06/85, Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wpO685.pdf. Mexico, Nigeria, and
Venezuela attached warrants to the "Brady bonds" that restructured their 1980s
international bank debt, wherein additional payments would be made to the bondholders
if oil prices rose sufficiently. Although Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Costa Rica
issued GDP-linked "Brady bonds" as part of their debt restructurings, most financial
market attention has focused on the GDP link in Argentina's 2005 bond swap. Id. at 5-7.
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access have not shown interest in issuing modified debt contracts,
even though it appears to be in their interest to do so."' This is not
to deny that the debt management offices of some developing
countries have explicitly sought to manage their sovereign
liabilities by altering their portfolios of obligations so as to reduce
risk and cost. For example, in some instances debt management
officials have prepaid riskier debt and issued more local currency
debt. 116 However, as noted, they have not sought to build risk
mitigation features into new bonds themselves." 7 Public sector
and academic efforts to promote development of such instruments
have so far been mainly treated as interesting curiosities."'
We are thus unable to escape the question of assessing the
ethics in servicing or not servicing standard sovereign loan
contracts. Alexander W. Cappelen, Rune J. Hagen, and Bertil
Tungodden, three Norwegian scholars, have suggested that it is
important to inquire who caused the debt crisis before giving debt
relief. "9 How much should the creditors have to forgo if the
losses-and poverty-of the borrower was its own fault? Is there
not a proper notion of "national responsibility" of sovereign
debtors and their people?
Cappelen and his colleagues invoke a "liberal egalitarian"
framework in their discussion, which seeks to distinguish when
persons or institutions should be held responsible for their
situation.12 0 Under this framework, inequalities that result from
115 That is, one is hard pressed to find cases of countries that issue such bonds when
they can issue standard bonds instead.
116 See IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND
ISSUES 85-126 (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/GFSR
2006/01/pdf/chp3.pdf.
117 See Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727
(2007).
118 There are, to be fair, some technical difficulties in issuing such securities, such
as appropriately pricing them in the market, owing to the uncertainty of their returns.
See Stephany Griffith-Jones & Krishnan Sharma, GDP Indexed Bonds: Making It
Happen (U.N. Secretariat, Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. 21 (April
2006), ST/ESA/2006/DWP/21), available at http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2006/
wp2 l_2006.pdf.
119 Alexander W. Cappelen, Rune Jansen Hagen, & Bertil Tungodden, National
Responsibility and the Just Distribution of Debt Relief, 21 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 69
(2007).
120 Id. at 71-75.
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"responsibility factors" are considered justified and thus should be
socially accepted (a principle of national responsibility). 2' In such
a case, the citizens of a poor country-albeit not necessarily the
poorest among them-should pay the government's debt. 122
However, inequalities for which agents are not responsible are
considered unjustified and should be eliminated (a principle of
international equalization). 23 In such cases, debt cancellation is
warranted. 124 Responsibility presupposes that national policies are
freely formulated and democratically adopted (as it can be argued
was the case in Argentina, but may not have been the case in many
other developing countries). 125 Further, as there is much
uncertainty and volatility regarding how policies turn out, they
argue that agents should only be held responsible for the "fair
consequences of borrowing." 1
26
The authors then ask if there is evidence that such a framework
has been used in according relief to the HIPCs, the group of
heavily indebted poor countries singled out for special debt relief
treatment. 12 7 Their answer is no.12 They find that the amount of
relief given to these countries is statistically related to the amount
of debt accumulated, but not to the degree of poverty in the
country. 129 If poverty was a non-responsibility factor, creditors
should have forgiven relatively more debt in poorer countries.
Instead, the results seem to conform more to the theologians'
argument for a "fresh start" discussed earlier, wherein one would
seek to bring each crisis country to a point where it had a fair
chance to succeed economically. 130 More indebted countries
would require more relief to get to this fair starting point,
regardless of who was at fault or whether there was a large or
small amount of poverty. In this perspective, the amount of relief
121 Id. at 72.
122 Id. at 74-75.
123 Id. at 72.
124 Id. at 74-75.
125 See Cappelen et al., supra note 119, at 73.
126 Id.at 75.
127 Id. at75-81.
128 Id. at 79.
129 Id.
130 Veerkamp, supra note 32.
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should be a function of the amount of indebtedness, as was found,
and not the extent of poverty.'3
It appears from this discussion that the theologians' approach
to debt is the opposite of the liberal egalitarian one. The biblical
call for periodic cancellation of debts, as discussed earlier, made
no reference to who was at fault in the accumulation of the
unpayable debt. Indeed, all debts were to be cancelled, even
payable ones. In Veerkamp's view, this was to prevent society
from becoming too unequal, to prevent the rich from getting too
rich or the poor from getting too poor. In the discussion by
Donnelly, the focus was more on the impulse of solidarity to
alleviate the suffering of the poor. To Trebat, the limit had been
reached on how much punishment the Argentine people should be
allowed to sustain in trying to service the debt. And in all variants
of the theological approach, individual or national blame for the
debt is beside the point. The perspective of the "fresh start" is
forward looking.
B. Responsibility of Creditors
If the argument that debtor governments should be held
responsible for their debt crises has not been reflected in
international debt relief policy, neither has the argument that
creditors should be liable for damages caused by their loans or the
policies they required of governments to get the loans. Kunibert
Raffer, a lawyer and economist at the University of Vienna, makes
the case for lender liability. 3 ' In fact, he charges that southern
governments that entered into debt crises after 1970 have born a
higher and disproportionate share of the cost of default than have
their creditors compared to the experience of debtor governments
over the previous century. 133 He also believes that sovereign
debtors have been treated worse than corporate debtors, owing in
part to the absence of a legal bankruptcy regime for governments,
as there are protections for the debtors (as well as the creditors) in
131 This does not imply donors were necessarily insensitive to poverty, as foreign
aid, unlike debt relief, could be allocated according to the extent of poverty.
132 See generally Kunibert Raffer, Risks of Lending and Liability of Lenders, 21
ETHICS & INT'L AFn. 85 (2007).
133 Id. at 86-93.
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bankruptcy laws.134 He blames these results on the great disparity
in economic power between the developing country debtors and
their different international creditors, which is illustrative of what
Barry and Tomitova, in the paper discussed above, referred to as
the problem of "substantive freedom" in borrowing, or rather the
lack thereof.'35
Raffer emphasizes that lenders should be held liable for
sovereign default when their actions impede the debtor from
honoring its obligations. 116 An example of such a case would be
where debtors cannot raise sufficient tax revenue to service their
debt because of artificial restraints on their country's exports (and
thus income) owing to tough import tariff and quota restrictions on
the goods in which the debtor economy has a comparative
advantage. 137 In the same vein, the major international
commercial banks are accused of having abetted the difficulties
that developing countries had in servicing their debts to those
banks in the 1980s, as their private banking arms helped rich
nationals remove their financial resources (capital flight), while
their sovereign lending arms kept extending loans that were
ultimately unpayable. '38
Raffer is particularly concerned about the behavior of the IFIs,
which insist on being the first in line to be repaid while pushing
debtor countries to adopt policies that he alleges have contributed
to the debt crises. 3 9 He cites cases in private law in which debtors
did not have to repay creditors that misled them. 4 ' Nothing of the
sort is available to sovereign debtors under international law.'4'
No one but the debtor pays for mistakes at this level.'42 He argues
not only that this is wrong, but also that each of the IFIs has the
legal and financial ability to grant relief through its normal
134 Id. at 93-95.
135 Id. at 95.
136 Id. at 95-103.
137 Id. at 96.
138 Raffer, supra note 132, at 101.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 102.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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decision-making processes and so could take financial
responsibility when its advice proved misguided.'43
Raffer further argues that better recognizing lender
responsibility is not only important for making international
financial relations fairer, but they would also lead to better
decisions. 144 Giving debtor governments the opportunity to claim
that responsibility for a crisis should be shared with the IMF or
World Bank should make the institutions more cautious in pushing
on governments whatever the current policy fad happens to be.'45
By the same token, the possibility that any of the creditors could
be held liable should make the "due diligence" expected of all
creditors individually into a better mechanism for crisis
prevention. 14
6
This line of argument also leads one to think about how other
types of creditors might be encouraged to lend "better" by
shouldering more responsibility for their loans. For example,
export credit agencies have been accused of promoting sales of
goods that developing countries do not need. 147 Indeed, in October
2006, the Norwegian Government agreed to "share responsibility"
for loans originally extended to cover the purchase of Norwegian
ships between 1976 and 1980 by twenty-one developing countries
in an export promotion campaign that was subsequently
discredited in an official evaluation by the Brundtland government
in 1988-89 as having been based on "inadequate needs analyses
and risk assessments" in which "a great many" of the funded
projects "proved to be unsustainable. ' 148 The current government
came to the conclusion that the operation had been a "development
policy failure" and it thus cancelled the $80 million remaining due
143 Id. at 101.
144 Raffer, supra note 132, at 105.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 This point was developed in a workshop discussion of an earlier draft of this
paper at Central European University, Budapest, Oct. 26, 2006.
148 See Press Release, Eurodad, Norway Makes Ground-Breaking Decision to
Cancel Illegitimate Debt (Oct. 10, 2006) (including official Royal Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs press release), available at http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew
/articles.aspx?id=302.
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from 5 countries. 149 This principle could be internationalized. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) in Paris hosts an intergovernmental Working Party on
Export Credits and Credit Guarantees that has already inscribed
"debt sustainability and responsible lending" on its agenda. 150
This forum could develop an agreed definition of "irresponsible"
lending and members could then promise to eschew making such
loans and not hold borrowing governments responsible for
repaying such loans if they are made. While borrowing
governments might nevertheless choose to service such loans (an
instance of deciding to pay when not having an obligation to pay),
in the event of default, one may be confident that these loans
would be accorded lower repayment priority than other debts of
the government.
C. Implications: Broader Responsibilities in Loan
Agreements?
Several policy questions are raised by the preceding
discussion, including how to help governments of developing
countries become better borrowers, how better to handle
international volatility and uncertainty, and how to hold creditors
(and debtors) accountable when they contribute to sovereign
insolvency. International technical assistance programs in debt
management and public finance contribute to the first goal.
Volatility and uncertainty have mainly been addressed outside the
debt contract per se, as in programs of compensatory official
financing to ease the impact of international commodity price
volatility.'' The last point, defining more clearly what should be
149 Id.
150 See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], 109th Meeting of the
Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG), 5 (Nov. 13-14, 2006),
available at http://www.oecd.org (search "109th export meeting"; then follow
hyperlink).
151 See IMF POL'Y DEV. & REV. DEP'T, GUIDANCE NOTE ON THE EXOGENOUS
SHOCKS FACILITY 4 (2006), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/pp/eng/
2006/012706.pdf (covering the new IMF facility including comparison to other
arrangements). Significant contingent financing programs were introduced decades ago
by the IMF and the European Union (the latter including grants for the poorest countries
when commodity export prices declined significantly), but were subsequently weakened
or retracted in the 1980s and 1990s, although they have seen a partial rethink in the
current decade, if only for the poorest countries. Id. See generally STEPHANY GRIFFITH-
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the responsibilities of different agents in debt contracts, has not
seen very much international policy follow through thus far,
although the recent attention paid to "odious" debt and the Equator
Principles may be interesting straws in the wind.
Unlike government regulation of the consumer market for
loans and national bankruptcy laws, there is no binding
international agreement on "truth in sovereign lending," nor are
there enforceable international rules or guidelines for treating
sovereign debt when crises arise. 152 There are only specific
contractual obligations in individual loans and the treatment of
those contracts in different national courts of law. 153 There is,
however, one example of supra-contractual international policy
embodied in a small set of cases in which the political authorities
of a state have, in essence, repudiated or forced the cancellation or
restructuring of their own or another county's debt obligations
based on the assertion that the government that incurred the debt
had carried out "odious" actions against its own people with funds
that the creditors helped to provide. 154
JONES & RICARDO GOTrSCHALK, INST. FOR DEV. STUDIES, COMPENSATORY FINANCING
FOR SHOCKS: WHAT CHANGES NEEDED? (2005) (for broad assessment of such facilities),
available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/Finance/pdfs/RGeconomicshockspaper.pdf.
152 See generally IMF, Standards and Codes, http://www.imf.org/external/
standards/index.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2007) (demonstrating that the guidelines that
do exist pertain to standards of public finance and debt reporting for IMF member
countries and codes on statistical and fiscal transparency, all of which are addressed to
issuers of sovereign debt). The primary effort to specify joint rules for sovereigns and
their lenders (meant only to apply to private sector creditors) entails purely voluntary
"commitments" by governments and major investment and commercial banks to
cooperate in good faith in good and bad times. See INST. OF INT'L FINANCE, PRINCIPLES
FOR STABLE CAPITAL FLOWS AND FAIR DEBT RESTRUCTURING IN EMERGING MARKETS
(2005), available at http://www.iif.com/download.php?id=c/48cJgSDtk.
153 See Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt
Workouts, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 333, 333-43 (2005) (discussing the response of different
branches of government to sovereign debt crises, particularly the difficulty of bringing
sovereign debtors into courts to resolve disputes); see also Hal S. Scott, Sovereign Debt
Default: Cry for the United States, Not Argentina, 13-22 (Wash. Legal Found., Working
Paper Series, No. 140, 2006), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/Scott%20WP%
20Final.pdf (noting that sovereign immunity agreements add to the difficulties of
enforcing contractual obligations in this context).
154 See Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King, & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt
Doctrine 21-29 (Centre for Int'l Sustainable Dev. Law Working Paper, Doc. No.
COM/RES/ESJ, 2003), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/
publications/AdvancingjtheOdiousDebtDoctrine.pdf.
[Vol. XXXII
SOVEREIGN DEBT-THEOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY
Under this doctrine, a sovereign government's debt may be
defined as "odious" if the funds were borrowed by a government
that lacks "legitimacy" in some sense, if they were not borrowed
for a public purpose (i.e., not to benefit the people in some sense),
and if the lenders were aware of both conditions when they made
the loans.' 55 The doctrine then says that a legitimate successor
state need not repay such odious debts. 5 6 The doctrine was most
famously applied by the United States after the Spanish-American
War of 1898 to explain why the new government of Cuba should
not be held responsible for the debts incurred when it was under
Spanish control.'57 The doctrine has also been cited recently in
arguments claiming the current Iraqi government should not have
to repay the creditors of the former Iraqi regime.'58 It has to be
noted that U.S. authorities made the case for both Cuba and Iraq at
times of strong U.S. interest (and military involvement) in each
place. "'59 It is an argument meant in these cases to punish creditors
(or their government patrons) for abetting the odiousness of a
government that has fallen, as much as to help the new
government.
Several civil society advocacy groups have also used the
doctrine to call for cancellation of the debts that governments in
some developing countries inherited from past governments. 160
However, these governments-especially those in fragile, new
democracies-seem most intent on knitting their society back
together and re-establishing normal international relations,
155 Id. at 13-19.
156 Id.
157 Louis A. Pdrez & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private Purpose:
Odious Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
699, 771-21 (2007).
158 See Jirgen Kaiser & Antje Queck, Dialogue on Globalization, Odious Debts-
Odious Creditors? International Claims on Iraq (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Dialogue on
Globalization, Occasional Papers No. 12, 2004), available at http://www.fesny.org/
docus/ffd/odiousdebts.pdf.
159 Id.; see also P6rez & Weissman, supra note 157.
160 See EURODAD EURO. NETWORK ON DEBT. DEV., SKELETONS IN THE CUPBOARD:
ILLEGITIMATE DEBT CLAIMS OF THE G7 (2007) available at, http://www.globalpolicy.org
/socecon/develop/debt/2007/0209skeletons.pdf (joint NGO report calling on the Group
of 7 industrialized countries to cancel specific debts owed them on grounds of
odiousness).
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including those with prospective creditors. A case prominently
discussed among civil society networks was that of South
Africa.16' Just as its post-apartheid government wanted "Truth and
Reconciliation," not new Nuremburg Trials, so too it wanted
investors-domestic as well as foreign-to be fully confident that
the South African government would honor its debt obligations
without interruption. 162 The South African authorities rejected
calls to nullify the debt on the basis of its odiousness. Efforts by
international advisors and civil society advocates to convince new
regimes in other countries to make the case for odious debt
cancellation have similarly been rejected by debtor country
finance ministries.
Debtor governments clearly appreciate that all the risk falls to
them if they initiate a claim that the debts inherited from a
previous regime are odious and should not be honored. Should
they unilaterally repudiate the debts, they may be frozen out of
future funds. If they plead their case to the international
community, they may receive a sympathetic hearing, when what
they need is some form of concrete statement that would be
acceptable to the government agencies, multilateral institutions,
and courts of the creditor countries, saying that payment of those
debts was not required.
This risk could be reduced if an anti-odiousness pledge were
written into the loan contracts.163 It would then be a matter of
determining whether an odious situation had occurred, not whether
odiousness would be an acceptable condition for non-payment.
164
This presupposes an internationally agreed definition of
odiousness and an international mechanism to judge individual
instances of externally financed odious behavior (not to mention
including enforceable legal covenants in the loan contract
protecting the claims of the non-odious creditors of an odious
debtor). 165 Such a project would require a very ambitious
international negotiation agenda. Yet it suggests that a contractual
161 See OdiousDebts.org, South Africa, http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/
index.cfm?DSP=subcontent&AreaID=159 (last visited Apr. 27, 2007).
162 Id.
163 See Feibelman, supra note 117.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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approach might be devised, in conjunction with international
political action, to move creditors and debtors towards accepting
broader responsibilities for their loan agreements.
In this regard, a potentially important precedent is being
established by the revised "Equator Principles" for preventing
negative environmental and social impacts of large-scale projects
financed by commercial banks. 166 Although banks voluntarily
adopt the principles, they do so under pressure from within the
industry and from civil society organizations, the net result of
which is that adoption of the revised principles has spread as of
February 2007 to forty-five institutions responsible for over
eighty-five percent of private cross-border "project finance"
(although the degree of implementation by participating banks is
apparently less than clear). 167 Of particular relevance to the
present discussion, institutions subscribing to the revised
principles are now required to include compliance covenants in
their loan agreements, including borrower promises to implement
"Action Plans" that are prepared according to specified procedures
in order to mitigate the potential adverse impacts of a project, and
to periodically report on implementation. 68 If the borrower fails
to comply, the lending banks "reserve the right to exercise
remedies, as they consider appropriate."' 169 It remains to be seen
what such "remedies" might be and how transparent the whole
process will become.
This initiative understandably has its critics as well as
supporters, 170 but is nonetheless notable for directly
acknowledging that there is an issue of creditor and debtor
responsibilities for what is done with borrowed monies. Also,
while the Principles were designed with an eye towards
complementing the Sustainability Policy of the International
166 THE "EQUATOR PRINCIPLES": A FINANCIAL INDUSTRY BENCHMARK FOR
DETERMINING, ASSESSING AND MANAGING SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN PROJECT
FINANCING 4 (July 2006), http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/Equator-
Principles.pdf.
167 See id.
168 See id., Princ. 8: Covenants.
169 Id.
170 See, e.g., Stephen Kass & Jean McCarroll, The Revised Equator Principles, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 1, 2006, at 3.
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Finance Corporation, the private lending arm of the World
Bank, 171 the internationally agreed processes for monitoring
implementation of the IFC commitment are not paralleled in the
case of the Principles.172 Thus they are a test of how far a purely
voluntary contractual approach can go in development of what we
may call ethical standards in lending. Finally, one may surmise
that the banks, which are, after all, agents of their depositors and
shareholders, developed the Equator Principles as a response to
pressures demanding they exercise more responsibility in their
lending rather than just assuming that the borrower will repay.
IV. An Extension of "Responsibility": Odiousness as a
Sanctions Regime
Some authors have taken the responsibility concerns
elaborated in the previous section and proposed that they be made
operational in a different way, namely as a sanctions regime
designed to change the behavior of rogue governments.
Internationally agreed-upon trade sanctions were viewed for a time
as a promising way nations could collectively isolate a country
that threatened its neighbors or seriously violated principles of
human rights, democracy, and development.'73 In practice, trade
sanctions have been a "blunt instrument."'74 To the extent they are
effective, trade sanctions cause economic disruption, close
factories, and impoverish people. ' Moreover, trade sanctions
171 See INT'L FIN. CORP., INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION'S POLICY AND
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY (2006),
available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/SustainabilityPolicy.
172 Id. 12-23 (noting that the IFC requires social and environmental reviews of
potential projects before funding them). The IFC also monitors the projects. Id. 26-29.
Finally, civil society complaints to a compliance advisor/ombudsman independent of
IFC management is provided for. Id. 31-35.
173 U.N. Charter art. 41 (providing that the Security Council could call upon
Member States to apply measures short of armed force "to give effect to its decisions"
which could include "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail,
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication"); see also
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 697-764 (2002) (for a review
of legal aspects of collective and unilateral sanctions).
174 BouTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 26 (2d ed. 1995).
175 Id. at 25-28; see also Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Civilian Impact of Economic
Sanctions, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL
CONFLICTS 274-3 15 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
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create strong incentives for evasion, as the rich will pay high
prices for prohibited imports. This means that the sanctions
disproportionately harm poor people. 76 To try to mitigate these
unintended consequences, policy makers began to consider more
precisely targeted sanctions. This brought some attention to
targeted financial sanctions, especially where they could be aimed
directly at the offending government without collateral
consequences. 1
77
In this context, Thomas Pogge, a philosopher at Columbia
University, has asked if there are times when a government's
ability to borrow abroad should be curtailed by other countries.'78
Interestingly, he turned the sanctions question around and asked
first what a fledgling democracy could do to protect itself from
potential coups d'itat. His answer was that it could try to make it
harder for an undemocratic successor regime to operate by
discouraging new foreign lending to that regime. 179 To be
effective, however, his proposal would also require broad
international cooperation, as in more conventional sanctions
regimes. 180
Pogge suggested that fledgling democracies amend their
constitutions so as to provide that debts incurred by any
undemocratic successor regime not be serviced out of the nation's
public funds.' 8 ' As the phrase "undemocratic regime" could be
open to interpretation, he proposed that the amendment specify
that an external entity determine when the regime had crossed
from democratic to non-democratic.1 2 This "Democracy Panel"
would be an independent entity formed from reputable and
176 See U.N. Off. for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aff., Humanitarian Impact
of Sanctions, http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Page=901 (last visited Apr. 27,
2007) (noting the U.N. Security Council now regularly requests assessments of the
humanitarian implications of the sanctions it imposes).
177 See generally WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, TARGETED
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: A MANUAL FOR DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (2001),
available at http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/TFS.pdf.
178 See Thomas Pogge, Achieving Democracy, 15 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 3 (2001).
179 Id. at 10-12.
180 Id. at 12-18.
181 Id. at 10-12.
182 Id. at 12.
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knowledgeable jurists, possibly under the auspices of the United
Nations.'83 Pogge's intention was that there would be an expert,
rather than a political, assessment that the country is no longer
democratic. 184
Pogge expected the leaders of a coup to suspend or annul the
constitution, thus permitting continued debt servicing during the
new regime, a practical quid pro quo for obtaining (and servicing)
new credit.185 Creditors would have to be concerned, however,
that democracy and the constitution might be restored and the
servicing of loans made during the non-democratic period
discontinued, for which risk they would compensate themselves
by adding a premium to the interest rate on any such loan. 186
Thus, foreign credit-at least foreign private credit-would be
more expensive and of uncertain availability to an odious
regime.' 87 Indeed, one could take the argument further and call on
creditor governments to cease providing their usual guarantees for
export financing and not approve any IFI loans to any regime that
was declared non-democratic by the Democracy Panel.'88
Pogge was quite concerned, however, that his proposal was too
radical and that the major democratic regimes would be less
anxious to promote fledgling democracies than to maintain
international financial rules.'89 One could add that foreign policies
vis-a-vis individual governments seem generally driven more by
concerns for national advantage than the international spread of
desirable principles. As he notes in a different context, in some
circumstances, the major powers might prefer a less democratic
but friendlier regime to a more democratic but more independent
183 Id. at 12-14.
184 See Pogge, supra note 178, at 12.
185 Id. at 11.
186 Id. at 10.
187 Id.
188 Moreover, if new loans were denied to such a non-democratic regime, it may be
expected that the regime would discontinue servicing the legitimate debts that were still
outstanding. Thus, so as not to punish those earlier creditors unfairly, Pogge also
proposed establishing a multilateral fund with resources provided by democratic
countries to cover the payments to the creditors that the "odious" regime ceased making.
Id. at 14-17.
189 Id. at 18.
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one.' 90 However, he believes the proposal could be put into effect
even without the support of the major powers, and should certainly
be put into effect with their active participation.' 9
Jonathan Shafter, lawyer, manager of private investment
partnerships, and Principal of Boston Provident, an investment
firm, further developed the idea of discouraging international
access to credit by rogue states as a way to strengthen democratic
regimes. 92 While Pogge formulates his proposal as a declaration
by an individual legitimate government not to honor financial
obligations entered into by an illegitimate successor regime and
calls for international support of that declaration, Shafter proposes
establishing an international sanctions regime to use against
governments that the international community deems odious. 93
Had such a system existed, we might add, the United Nations
sanctions imposed on South Africa's apartheid regime in 1985
could have included a declaration that any loans extended to the
regime would not have to be paid by a proper successor regime.
This would have created strong pressure on banks not to lend, as
their home governments would have in essence declared that they
would oppose attempts to collect on those loans through the
courts. 194 This would have greatly strengthened international
pressure on the regime.
Shafter admits, however, that a blanket discouragement of
lending to a regime subject to sanctions would be too extreme, and
could prevent government projects that would benefit the people
forced to live under that regime.' 95 Creditors might wish to lend
for such projects, but they would need some way to determine that
the loan actually had a public purpose, and be able to prove in the
future that it had reason to believe that to be the case so as to avoid
190 Pogge, supra note 178, at 21.
191 Id. at 17.
192 See Jonathan Shafter, The Due Diligence Model: A New Approach to the
Problem of Odious Debts, 21 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 49 (2007).
193 Id.
194 One could add that banks that did lend would have explicitly worked against
their governments' foreign policy, which is terrible public relations, especially for
publicly regulated institutions like banks.
195 Shafter, supra note 192, at 58.
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the loan being declared "odious" and non-payable. 196 For this
reason, Shafter introduces what he calls the "due diligence"
model. 97
The proposal is that first an international organization be
charged to declare countries "odious prone," based on the
principles of international law given to it.198 The member states of
the organization would make the determination, and so the finding
would be political, albeit justified by international law.' 99 This is
not only a matter of pragmatism, but also recognition that there is
much room for interpretation in whether a government rules with
the "consent" of the governed z0 Potential creditors would then
need to assure themselves through "reasonable due diligence" that
the loan they are considering is for a public purpose and they
would need to monitor the loan to ensure that it is actually used in
the way envisaged. 201 The international organization would
presumably issue guidelines on this. In any event, the
organization should certify that the creditors' due diligence on the
proposed project was adequate for the loan to go forward. This
certification would be based on the "no action" letters model
followed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
United States when there is concern that proposed transactions
might run afoul of regulations. 202 In essence, this puts
responsibility for properly assessing the project on the creditors, in
exchange for which they can be confident their loan will not be
declared odious. °3
The proposal has many attractive features, but much still needs
to be fleshed out, as the author himself concludes. 2' First, should
the organization be placed in the United Nations, which is
universal, but as such often has difficulty in reaching consensus, or
196 Id. at 54-56
197 Id. at 58-65.
198 Id. at 59-60.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 56-58.
201 Shafter, supra note 192, at 60-63.
202 Id. at61.
203 Id. at61.
204 Id. at 65-66.
[Vol. XXXII
SOVEREIGN DEBT-THEOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY
should it be in a more homogeneous organization, such as the
OECD, which brings together the developed country democracies
and certain large emerging democracies, such as Mexico.2 °5 One
could also envisage a freestanding organization of "like-minded"
countries. In addition, decisions would have to be reached on the
range of application of the sanctions regime; e.g., should it cover
government and IFI lending or only the private sector?20 6 Finally,
much detailed work is still needed to be able to move from the
general prescription of "due diligence" to the legal requirements
for deal structuring and auditing.0 7 It appears to be, however, a
very interesting proposal.
Nevertheless, odiousness is far from ready to enter the toolkit
of preventive diplomacy. To start, there is no consensus on the
concept of odiousness, or of democracy. Moreover, international
intervention on a domestic issue like the form of government in a
country has little basis in international law.208 On the other hand,
the world needs a stronger international human rights policy.
There is a formal global agreement defining human rights, which
was the result of decades of deliberations, negotiations, and legal
inquiries on human rights.2° Might odiousness better be defined
by international agreement in terms of major and sustained
violation of human rights? Might the world agree to international
interventions to stop such human rights abuses? Might not the
models of Pogge and Shafter help shape a tool of diplomacy that is
more than a non-binding resolution expressing outrage, better
targeted than trade sanctions, and less destructive than military
invasion?
205 Id. at 63-65.
206 Id. at 66. Note that, if IFIs were included, it would mean accepting that there
were conditions under which IFI loans should not be repaid.
207 Shafter, supra note 192, at 60-63.
208 See generally SHAW, supra note 83, at 1039-48 (discussing the principle of non-
intervention as understood today).
209 The basic document is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg.,
UN Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). See generally SHAW, supra note 83, at chps. 6, 7, 21
(discussing human rights law and practice).
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V. We Still Need an International Forum for the Fair
Treatment of Sovereign Debt
Arguments for relieving developing countries of excessive
debt and for distinguishing responsibilities of different parties in a
loan are one thing. Turning them into international policy is quite
another. Developing this international policy requires having an
international forum in which to address these concerns
transparently, in a coherent way, and with the participation of all
the relevant stakeholders. It does not necessarily mean the
creation of a new forum, but it does require the existence of a
place with a roof, enough seats, and booths for interpreters. One
should want, first, a forum that is appropriate for agreeing to a set
of principles, such as have been discussed here, and for designing
mechanisms for their application. Second, one would want an
effective and independent operational arm to apply the principles
when and as necessary. This has been, and remains, a missing
piece of the global financial architecture.
Indeed, since the 1970s, different policy writers have
suggested introducing into the official international system some
mechanism for sovereign debtors that would parallel the
bankruptcy laws and their judicial instrumentalities that exist at
the national level in most countries.21° International civil society
organizations began to advocate for such a reform of the
international financial architecture, especially in the 1990s, but to
little avail.211
Suddenly, in late 2001 the idea entered the agenda of the IMF
and became a serious matter for consideration by policy makers.
The staff of the IMF had already been internally considering an
institutional model for addressing sovereign bankruptcy when the
Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Paul O'Neill, voiced support for
studying such a proposal.212 The First Deputy Managing Director
210 See generally Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures
for Sovereign: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002),
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf
(reviewing many of the proposals).
211 Several of the civil society proposals have been collected in THE DEBT PROBLEM
FOR POOR COUNTRIES: WHERE ARE WE? (Rogate R. Mshana ed., 2004).
212 Brad Setser, The Political Economy of Bankruptcy 2 (Columbia Univ. Initiative
for Pol'y Dialogue, paper for the Task Force on Sovereign Debt, draft of July 12, 2006)
(citing The U.S. Financial System in the Wake of the Attack on the World Trade Center:
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of the IMF at the time, Anne Krueger, then launched the proposal
as the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) in a
speech in November 2001."13 This was followed in March 2002
when the United Nations Conference on Financing for
Development encouraged work to go forward on "an international
debt workout mechanism" like the SDRM.214 The ministerial
oversight committee of the IMF in September 2002 then requested
that a "concrete proposal" for a statutory SDRM be elaborated for
its consideration the following April. 215 The private financial
markets mobilized in opposition, joined later by some of the major
developing country borrowers, and the United States, which had
rethought its position under a new Treasury Secretary, John
Snow.216 By the end of April 2003, the proposal was dead.217
Up to the moment of its demise, SDRM was hotly debated in
multiple conferences in Europe and North America.218 In one such
discussion at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International
Affairs, Ann Pettifor, former coordinator of the Jubilee Campaign,
argued forcefully for an alternative proposal to SDRM. 2 9 Her
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Aff., U.S., 107th Congress,
(2001) (statement of Paul O'Neil, Secretary of Treasury)).
213 Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, IMF, Int'l Fin. Architecture for
2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address at the Am. Enter. Inst.
in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 26, 2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/
112601.htm.
214 See Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mex., Mar. 18-22,
2002, Monterrey Consensus, 60, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 198/11.
215 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Int'l Monetary Fund, Communiqu6 of the
Int'l Monetary and Financial Comm. 11 (Sept. 28, 2002),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2002/prO245.htm.
216 As he said in his statement to the IMFC, "it is neither necessary nor feasible to
continue working on SDRM." John Snow, Treasury Sec'y, Statement at the Int'l
Monetary and Fin. Comm. Meeting in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 12, 2003), http://www.ustreas
.gov/press/releases/js 185.htm.
217 See generally Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure
Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 299 (2003).
218 Two important meetings that might be mentioned in this regard were the
"Conference on the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism" at IMF Headquarters,
Wash., D.C., January 22, 2003 and the International Policy Dialogue on "New Sovereign
Debt Restructuring Mechanisms: Challenges and Opportunities," organized by
Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (inWEnt) and the German
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Berlin, Feb. 21-22, 2003.
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N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
proposal for an international institution dealing with debt was
based on three principles that seem fully consistent with the
analyses discussed in earlier sections of this paper. First, as both
debtors and creditors could be held responsible for a sovereign
debt crisis, they should share the burden of relief to the extent that
each side was "reckless, irresponsible[,] and delinquent." 220
Second, "no one should be judge in their own court," which is to
say that the judge should not be one of the creditors. 22 And third,
the mechanism should be "open, transparent, and accountable to
citizens and taxpayers. 222
The Jubilee framework had been inspired by Chapter 9 of the
U.S. bankruptcy code (applying to municipalities and other non-
sovereign public entities) and the ad hoc arbitration panels that are
formed under the International Chamber of Commerce or other
bodies to resolve disputes between direct investors and their host
governments. 223 The framework thus called for an ad hoc,
independent body, operating under transparent procedures,
representing the interests of both the creditors and the citizens of
the debtor country. 224 The restructuring plan would be developed
by a panel formed for each case, with equal numbers of
representatives from the debtor and creditor sides, who would
jointly appoint an additional person to act as chair.225 Pettifor also
proposed that the United Nations, rather than IMF, should oversee
the debt sustainability analysis that would provide the analytical
background for the discussion of how much reduction of debt was
needed.226
Many experts and some governments, especially in Europe,
while considering the SDRM a flawed proposal, advocated further
development of the ideas it was meant to address.227 In fact, not
AFF. 2, 2-9 (2003).
220 Id. at 2.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 3.
224 Id. at 8.
225 Pettifor, supra note 219, at 8.
226 Id.
227 See, e.g., Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown, Chair of the Int'l Monetary and Fin. Comm.,
Statement at the Int'l Monetary and Fin. Comm. Meeting in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 12,
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much has happened in this regard since the death of SDRM.
Moreover, Argentina showed there could be an advantage to a
debtor government in not settling with its creditors all at once in a
comprehensive approach. Argentina settled first with the creditors
it needed most and let arrears to the others accumulate in an
acrimonious atmosphere. 228 Foreign bondholders waited four
years for a resolution and then settled for about 27 cents on the
dollar. 229  This may not have been a fair apportionment of the
relief among the creditors, but that was not Argentina's problem.
Market-based solutions are not ipso facto fair. Argentina was also
not the typical debtor developing country. Its default was "by far
the largest and potentially most complex default the world has
ever known.,
23 °
Nevertheless, the case for a statutory approach to debt
workouts-even an "ad hoc" and informal mechanism that
nevertheless pushes all creditors to work with the debtor for a
comprehensive solution-remains as robust as ever. The question
was never that a sovereign bankruptcy regime was needed,
because the current system would fail to produce a solution. No
one should doubt that existing mechanisms will resolve sovereign
2003), http:H/www.imf.orglexternal/spring/2003/imfc/state/eng/gbr.htm (quoting Gordon
Brown, Chair of the IMFC, stating at the meeting at which work on the SDRM was
stopped that it was "important to take forward work on the issues identified in the
development of the SDRM"); Hans Eichel, Minister of Fin. of F.R.G., Statement at the
Int'l Monetary and Fin. Comm. Meeting in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 12, 2003),
http://www.imf.orglextemal/springl2003/imfclstate/eng/deu.htm (quoting Hans Eichel,
Germany's finance minister, stating that "we believe that in times of particularly acute
distress, the need for more far reaching instruments [than agreed thus far] cannot be
ruled out .... We expect that the discussion of the SDRM will continue."). See
generally Barry Herman, Mechanisms for Dialogue and Debt-Crisis Workout That Can
Strengthen Sovereign Lending to Developing Countries, in CHALLENGES TO THE WORLD
BANK AND IMF: DEVELOPING COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES 203-26 (Ariel Buira ed., 2003)
(discussing the topic from a technical level).
228 See Mario Damill, Roberto Frenkel, & Martfn Rapetti, The Argentinean Debt:
History, Default and Restructuring (Columbia Univ. Initiative for Pol'y Dialogue
Working Paper Series, 2005), http://wwwO.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/SDR-Argentina-
EnglishRevised_9_5_05.pdf.
229 Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Haircuts: Estimating Investor
Losses in Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998-2005 29-49 (IMF, Working Paper No.
WP/05/137, 2005).
230 Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of
Argentina's Default, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 311, 317 (2005).
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debt crises, or that the crisis countries that had borrowed from the
private markets previously will come again to enjoy market
access. The concern here is not whether debt crises would be
resolved, but whether they would be resolved justly. This involves
first that there be appropriate international processes for reaching a
just restructuring of the debt, but it also involves, complementing
it, as discussed earlier, that there be appropriate allocation and
effective monitoring of the cash flow consequences of the relief,
which should in any case be part and parcel of the overall integrity
of a democratic regime.
How does the international community go from here to there?
One lesson to be drawn from the SDRM experience is that the
time has passed in which a proposed major innovation in
international financial architecture that could seriously impact
developing countries can be developed behind closed doors in the
institutions of the North and presented almost full cloth to
governments for adoption on short notice. Governments that do
not participate in developing the forum will feel no ownership or,
at best, support it weakly. Powerful non-governmental
stakeholders that see their interests threatened-whether they are
right or wrong-will fight it. It requires a strong sense that the
global public purpose will be served by the innovation to counter
such opposition.
In this context, it seems that the end point of the SDRM debate
can be turned into the starting point for a new debate, especially
now that some years have passed and tempers have cooled. The
SDRM and counter proposals made by the financial community at
the time could all have been stamped "Made in the North."
Governments of the debt-issuing countries of the South came to be
among the most vocal opponents of them. No finance minister in
the South has the personal constitution to talk about what she
ought to do if she cannot meet the next debt payment, especially if
she does not actually face a looming crisis. However, other parties
in the South ought to raise that question. Indeed, as we are
currently not in a period of debt crisis, there is a space in which to
think about the issue, develop a new proposal, starting from an
idea and not a full-blown prospective piece of legislation, building
consensus and momentum as it is further developed, and then,
when the political opportunity arises, move it to adoption.
Sovereign default is never attractive politically, economically,
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or socially, but sometimes it is necessary, even for well-managed
governments. That is the reality of the global economy today as
much as it was in the 18th century. Sean Hagan, in his reflections
on the SDRM episode, began with a quote from Adam Smith that
bears citing as the conclusion of this paper:
When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt,
in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an
individual to do so, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is
always the measure which is both least dishonorable to the
debtor and least hurtful to the creditor.3
All of history tells us sovereign bankruptcy will again become
necessary. We should be better prepared next time.
231 Hagan, supra note 217, at 300 (quoting ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 416
(1776)).
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